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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a high demand for informal savings mechanisms even
though these often feature negative returns - such as deposit collectors, ROSCAs, microloans, and
informal borrowing. This paper argues that individuals may face even higher negative returns to
saving at home due to hyperbolic discounting and claims on savings by relatives. I outline a model
that shows why hyperbolic discounters cannot reach their welfare-maximising level of savings, and
why a commitment savings product with fixed period contributions can increase their achievable
savings level. Using a novel dataset obtained from a small microfinance institution in Bangladesh,
the paper then presents some first empirical evidence on the effects of a commitment savings prod-
uct with fixed regular instalments. I find that the introduction of the regular saver product was
associated with an increase in individuals’ savings contributions of 180 percent after a periods of
five months. The paper concludes that the provision of commitment savings products with fixed
contributions may reduce savings constraints and increase individuals’ welfare, providing a sub-
stitute for costly informal mechanisms. However, since the data originates from a field study with
self-selection problems rather than a randomized controlled experiment, further studies are needed
to confirm this effect.
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1 Introduction
There are many reasons why even individuals with very low incomes have the need to convert small
everyday sums of money into larger lump sums. Among them are life-cycle needs (such as marriage,
childbirth, education or homebuilding), insurance against emergencies (like sickness, loss of employ-
ment, natural desasters) and business opportunities (e.g. buying land or a new machine). To obtain
these lump sums, individuals use a variety of financial services – many of which are very costly. In
particular, observational evidence indicates a popularity of borrowing for consumption purposes, as
well as for periodic business expenses (e.g., to maintain stock).1 In both cases, obtaining a loan is not
essential to generating the income that will repay it (as opposed to one-off investments, say, purchas-
ing a piece of land): Many clients go through a loan cycle every month for years, paying back in small
instalments every week. A savings cycle with frequent contributions differs from this in one initial
loan disbursement, which pales in size compared to annualized interest rates between 100 and 500
percent.2 Given such interest rates, the decision to borrow rather than to save seems puzzling.
A similar puzzle is the popularity of costly or inflexible savings mechanisms: Consider the wan-
dering deposit collectors found in South Asia and Africa.3 Rutherford (1999) illustrates their work
with the example of a woman in India who collects a fixed amount of 5 or 10 Rupees per day from
a client. She returns their savings after 220 days, charging a fee of 20 days’ deposits for her service.
This is equivalent to an annualized interest rate of minus 30 percent. Demand for such services is high
– but there are few individuals who have build up the trust and reputation needed to provide this
service, severely limiting supply.
Finally, a savings mechanism that has been prominently featured in the literature (e.g. Besley et
al. (1993), Gugerty (2007)) and is prevalent all across the developing world are rotating savings and
credit organizations (ROSCAs). A ROSCA is a group of people who meet regularly to each put a fixed
amount of money into a “pot”. The content of the pot is given to a different member of the group at
each meeting. While ROSCAs are costless, they are inflexible to an individual member’s needs.
The obvious question to ask is: Why do people not just save at home, instead of relying on such
costly devices? An answer suggested in the existing literature are hyperbolic (or quasi-hyperbolic)
preferences.4 Hyperbolic discounters are impatient over current trade-offs (now vs. tomorrow) and
patient over future trade-offs (one year vs. one year plus one day). As a result, they procrastinate
saving. This leads either to failure to reach their savings target, or to a failure to smooth consumption
over time by saving too much in the last minute. If hyperbolic individuals realize their own time
inconsistency, they will be willing to pay for commitment savings products which enable them to
overcome their present bias by forcing them to save.
A second factor which receives increasing attention are financial claims from relatives, neighbours
and spouses. Slum communities and rural villages are often close-knit social networks. If an individ-
ual has managed to save money at home, she may be informally obligated to help out a neighbour
who has fallen on hard times, a relative who needs medical treatment, or simply a husband who
1See e.g., Collins et al. (2009), the Indian vegetable vendors studied in Ananth et al. (2007), or Rutherford (1999).
2See e.g., Rutherford (1999) or Ananth et al. (2007).
3See e.g. Besley (1995) on West Africa’s susu collectors.
4Most prominently, Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
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claims the remains of the household budget for personal expenses.5 Awareness of claims on liquid
assets may sharply reduce incentives to save in the first place. As in the previous case, such individ-
uals may develop a preference for commitment to “safeguard” their savings.
In recent years, a burgeoning literature on commitment savings has confirmed the empirical
link between hyperbolic discounting, intra-household bargaining and a preference for commitment:
Bauer et al. (2012) find that individuals in their sample who have been identified as hyperbolic keep a
lower proportion of their savings at home and are more likely to borrow from microcredit organiza-
tions.6 Ashraf et al. (2006b) find that hyperbolic preferences predict take-up of a commitment savings
product which features withdrawal restrictions. Gugerty (2007) finds ROSCA participation patterns
to be consistent with both time-inconsistent preferences and low intra-household bargaining power
(only husband has formal sector income) – i.e. individuals value public pressure to save. Finally,
Anderson and Baland (2002) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between women’s autonomy
from their husbands (as proxied by female share of household income) and participation in ROSCAs:
Participation in ROSCAs is high when female autonomy is high enough to persuade their husband
to let them join, but not so high that the protection which the ROSCA provides is no longer needed.
This paper provides suggestive evidence that the popularity of inflexible ROSCAs, costly deposit
collectors and (partly) of microcredit and informal borrowing may simply represent a demand for a
commitment savings product with fixed periodic contributions (hereafter: “regular saver product”),
as it is commonly offered by banks in rich countries. Using a model of hyperbolic discounting, it is
shown that individuals cannot reach their welfare-maximising level of savings when saving at home,
and that a regular saver product can increase their achievable savings level, as well as smooth sav-
ings contributions over time. Using a novel dataset with administrative savings data for 2006-2010
from a small MFI in Bangladesh, it is found that the introduction of a regular saver product is indeed
associated with a large increase in individual’s savings levels. The intuition is straightforward: If
individuals are present-biased, the ability to tie themselves to a particular savings schedule which
they would not be able to stick to otherwise improves their welfare by enabling them to afford lump-
sum expenditures (such as school tuition or a house repair). It may further improve their welfare by
smoothing savings (and consumption) over time. Regarding relatives or spouses’ claims, a regular
saver product will help by restricting withdrawals on past savings. For present savings, if the penal-
ties associated with default are high enough, the individual may be able to argue that this money is
“accounted for” and cannot be used for a different purpose.
While this view is neither new nor surprising, the existing literature on formal commitment sav-
ings has focused almost exclusively on savings products featuring withdrawal restrictions, but with-
out an obligation to deposit in the first place. Notable examples include Ashraf et al. (2006b), who
find a positive effect on savings levels using a withdrawal-restriction product in the Philippines.
Dupas and Robinson (2013) study a similar (though not as strict) withdrawal-restriction product in
Kenya and find increased investment in clients’ small businesses. Brune et al. (2011) randomly of-
5See the literature on informal insurance and need-based gift exchange, e.g. Morduch (1999).
6They also attribute the preference of present-biased women for microcredit over other sources of borrowing to the structure
and support that microcredit provides. However, the central feature of fixed regular repayments is shared by virtually all other
common forms of borrowing.
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fered withdrawal-restriction accounts to smallholder cash crop farmers, and found a positive effect
on agricultural input use, as well as on subsequent crop sales and household expenditures. Other
notable savings interventions included text message reminders (Karlan et al. (2010)) and deposit col-
lectors (Ashraf et al. (2006a), Giné et al. (2010)).7 However, to the author’s knowledge, none of the
formal commitment savings accounts which have been studied so far commit clients to make future
deposits.
For a hyperbolic discounter, simply giving him the opportunity to restrict his withdrawals will not
do - he will be prevented from touching past savings, but will have no added incentive to contribute
further. Similarly, someone constrained by relatives’ claims can protect past savings, but not current
income (before visiting the bank). Benartzi and Thaler (2004)’s “SMarT” program in the U.S. allows
individuals to commit to allocating their future salary increases towards their retirement savings.
This comes closest to the objective of this paper in the sense that the program imposes fixed (or even
increasing) savings contributions. However, the context of defined-contribution pension plans in the
U.S. is very different from the Bangladeshi slum context studied here.
This paper takes advantage of a ‘natural experiment’ following the introduction of a commitment
savings product with fixed regular contributions by the MFI SafeSave in a slum community in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, in June 2009. Using administrative savings data obtained from the MFI for the period
2006-2010, the paper presents suggestive evidence on the effect of the regular saver product on indi-
viduals’ savings contributions. In a classical differences-in-differences estimation, I find that savings
contributions during a five months period increase by 523Tk (about U.S. $7) more relative to past
year savings than those of a ‘control group’ formed by later adopters of the product. This represents
a 180 percent increase compared to average previous year savings. Allowing for multiple ‘treatment
groups’ depending on month of entry into the product further shows a significant effect for four or
more months of treatment.
The estimates are to be taken with a pinch of salt: The data comes from a field experiment, where
selection into ‘treatment’ with the product is not randomly assigned, but self-selected. The resulting
endogeneity is kept to a minimum by using early adopters of the product as a treatment group and
late adopters (who had the product for only part of the period of observation) as a control group. The
paper takes the remaining endogeneity of adoption timing seriously and rules out as many differ-
ences between early and late adopters as the data permits. I find that the estimate of the treatment
effect is robust and even increases when various controls as well as pre-existing time trends for the
treatment groups are included. Unfortunately, it is impossible to control for all differences between
early and late adopters. Hence, this analysis of the effect of a commitment savings product with fixed
regular contributions is best interpreted as a starting point for further research in this area, and as a
motivation to improve on the estimates presented here using randomized control methodologies.
While it would ultimately be interesting to compare the performance of a savings product with
restricted withdrawals to a savings product with fixed regular contributions, this paper will focus
on the question whether regular saver products can increase savings levels (by overcoming savings
7Also see Beshears et al. (2011) for a comparison of different withdrawal restrictions, Dupas and Robinson (2011) for the
effect of informal savings technologies on health investment, and Bryan et al. (2010) for a review of commitment devices
beyond savings.
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constraints) relative to autarky. In an attempt to answer this question and complement the empirical
analysis, the paper takes a theoretical approach to show that with hyperbolic discounting, a regular
saver product increases the range of parameter values where a savings goal (the price of a nondivisi-
ble) can be reached, as well as smoothing savings contributions.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines a model of savings with hyperbolic discounting
and looks at the effect of a regular saver product. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes the
empirical strategy, discusses possible sources and remedies of the endogeneity issue, and presents
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Conceptual Framework
2.1 A Savings Model with Hyperbolic Discounters
The introductory section has painted the picture of a large unmet demand for commitment savings
products with regular contributions (from now on: “regular saver products”). It has been suggested
that this demand may result from present-biased preferences, as well as from the desire to protect
one’s savings for necessary household expenditures from claims by relatives and other community
members. There is, however, no theoretical foundation which explicitly justifies a need for regular
saver products, as opposed to commitment products which simply carry withdrawal restrictions.
The following section attempts to provide a stylised model that is simple, yet capable of explaining
how regular saver products may help hyperbolic discounters achieve higher savings levels. Higher
savings levels, in turn, will enable them to afford welfare-increasing lump-sum expenditures - such
as commonly needed for education, a long-awaited medical treatment, a new roof, a bride’s dowry, or
a business investment. The benchmark model without banking services follows Basu (2012)’s theory
of saving under hyperbolic preferences, but departs from it in the design of the commitment savings
product in the second part of the model.
To model achievable savings levels, consider an agent who decides whether to save up for a non-
divisible good which costs the lump-sum 1 < p < 3 and yields a monetary benefit b > 3. The agent
lives for 3 periods and receives a non-stochastic per period income of 1, which he can either consume
immediately or save. He cannot borrow. His instantaneous utility function is assumed to be twice
differentiable and strictly concave, i.e. u′(c) > 0 and u′′(c) < 0. His lifetime utility as evaluated in
each period is given by the discounted sum of the instantaneous utilities:





When β < 1, the discount rate between the current period t and t +1 is lower than the discount
rate between subsequent periods – i.e. the agent exhibits a present bias. The model will assume
that he is a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter – i.e. he realizes that his future selves will display the
same present bias that he has, and apply the discount function 1, β, β, resulting in an inconsistency
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between the preferences of his current self and the preferences of his t+k-selves.8 The model further
assumes that there is no other form of discounting (i.e. δ = 1). While the literature disagrees on how
to evaluate the welfare of hyperbolic discounters, the most commonly applied criterion which will
be used for the purposes of this paper is the one proposed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999): The
welfare of a hyperbolic discounter is what he would like to maximise in a hypothetical period 0, i.e.
just before the start of his life. His welfare is then given by
W = u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3).
Finally, I will assume a gross return on savings of R=1 in both the autarky and the banking scenario.
This will later make it possible to isolate the effect of commitment on savings levels, since it is not
profitable for individuals to use banking services simply to gain higher returns.
We can infer the welfare-maximising solution to the savings problem: Given the agent’s desire to
smooth consumption over time, it is optimal for him to split the necessary savings burden of p− 1
evenly over periods 1 and 2, and then spend his period 3 income plus accumulated savings on the
good (the implied consumption profile is c1 = c2 = (3 − p)/2, c = b).9 This is preferable to not




) + u(b) ≥ 3u(1).
The remaining part of the section will assume that this equation holds – i.e. it is optimal for the agent
to buy the good.
2.1.1 The Autarky Equilibrium
Since the agent is aware that he will follow different time preferences every period, his equilibrium
behaviour represents the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of a game that he plays with his consec-
utive selves. Basu (2012) shows that without banking, the nondivisible will be purchased for any β
above a critical βˆ . Since the focus of this paper is on achievable savings levels for given time prefer-
ences, we will show how this translates into a critical price pmax = f (β) . If the nondivisible costs less
than pmax, it will be purchased.
Finding an equilibrium of this game is straightforward if β = 1: The agent’s objectives are time-
consistent, and his maximisation problem will coincide exactly with the welfare maximisation de-
scribed above – in other words, he will always buy the nondivisible given the above condition, and
save p−12 in periods 1 and 2.
In the hyperbolic discounting case of β < 1, the individual has to be treated as three separate
optimising agents, one in each period. In period 1 and 2, the agent decides how much money st to
send to the next period, and the period 3 self decides whether to buy the good (if possible). The game
can be solved by backward induction.
8The results of the model will hold to some extent if he is partially sophisticated, but not if he is perfectly naïve, i.e. if his
current self believes that future selves will share his preferences.
9If p < 2, he could save p− 1 in period 1 and buy the good in period 2. However, this yields no additional benefit given
our assumption of δ = 1 and implies a more uneven consumption profile.
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Period 3
Given b > p, the agent will buy the nondivisible whenever he can afford it, i.e. whenever s2 ≥ p− 1.
Any additional savings s2 > p − 1 are simply consumed. The same happens with savings that are
not sufficient to buy the good. Period 3 consumption is thus
c3 =
1+ s2 − p + b i f s2 ≥ p− 11+ s2 i f s2 < p− 1.
Period 2
The period 2 self knows the good will be bought if and only if he sends s2 ≥ p− 1. This reduces the
analysis to two relevant cases: If he wants the good to be bought, he will send s2 = p − 1 exactly:
Given that utility is concave and period 3 will get the utility associated with b, the marginal utility
from sending an additional unit to period 3 will be much lower than that of consuming it in period 2.
The utility he receives is U2 = u(1+ s1− (p− 1)) + βu(b). If he does not want the good to be bought,
he will decide to optimally allocate the savings s1 that he received from the first period between
period 2 and 3, i.e. he finds s2 ∗ (s1) = argmax[u(1+ s1 − s2) + βu(1+ s2)] subject to 0 ≤ s2 < p− 1.
In consequence, he will prefer that the good is bought if
u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s1 − s2∗) + βu(1+ s2∗).
Proposition 1. The above equation holds if s1 is bigger than some threshold value, s1 ≥ smin .
(Proofs of all propositions are in Appendix B.)
Proposition 2. smin is weakly decreasing in β.
Hence, once s1 crosses some threshold smin, saving for the good will be optimal for all s1 ≥ smin.
For β = 1, we know that smin ≤ p−12 , since the agent is willing to follow the welfare-maximising
savings plan. For very low β, smin is likely to be higher than 1, i.e. the good cannot be purchased as
the agent would rather consume his savings.
Period 1
Analogous to finding the minimum s1 that the period 1 agent needs to send to period 2 to make him
save for the nondivisible, we can find the maximum s1 that he is willing to save in order to receive the
good. If this maximum is bigger than the minimum needed, the good will be purchased. Note that,
conditional on the good not being purchased, the period 1 agent prefers to save s1 = 0 to smooth his
consumption path (if anything, he would like to borrow from the future, but is not able to do so by
assumption). He knows this will lead to s2 = 0 and thus to U1 = (1+ 2β)u(1). The maximum that he
is willing to pay for the purchase of the nondivisible (i.e. for s2 = p− 1) can be found by comparing
u(1− s1) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ (1+ 2β)u(1).
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Define smax as the maximum value of s1 such that this inequality holds (if there is no such value, let
smax = 0).
Proposition 3. smax is weakly increasing in β.




With smin weakly decreasing and smax weakly increasing in β, there will be a threshold level βˆ such
that smin(β) ≤ smax(β) for any β ≥ βˆ. How do we know βˆ is in the relevant interval [0, 1]? We
know that smin(0) > smax(0) since smin(0) > 1, smax(0) = 0 and that smin(1) ≤ smax(1) as the non-
hyperbolic agent always purchases the good. This means that the intersection smin = smax occurs for
some βˆ ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, the nondivisible is purchased in equilibrium for the range β ∈ [βˆ, 1].
Since we have assumed 1 < p < 3, it is possible that the agent may be willing to save p − 1 in
period 1, enjoy the good in period 2, and consume his income in period 3. This is symmetric to the
case in which a period 2 agent is willing to save p− 1 in order to receive the good in the third period,
i.e. the case that smin(β) = 0. Hence, this option is nested in our model. This case will generally
not be of practical importance, since the implied restrictions on β are stronger than those when the
necessary savings p− 1 can be split over two periods.
How does the optimal savings schedule look in equilibrium? For β ∈ [0, βˆ) we know s1 = s2 = 0.
Above βˆ, if β is large and smin(β) low, period 1 may want to save more than smin voluntarily in order
to smooth consumption. Ideally, he would like to save s1 = sopt such that u′(1− sopt) = β . He will
follow this optimal plan whenever sopt ≥ smin.10 This leads us to an equilibrium optimal savings
schedule:
s1 =
max(smin, sopt) i f β ∈ [βˆ, 1]0 i f β ∈ [0, βˆ) , s2 =
p− 1 i f β ∈ [βˆ, 1]0 i f β ∈ [0, βˆ) .
Achievable Savings Levels in the Autarky Equilibrium
Using the savings model of Basu (2012), it has been derived that for a given price p of the nondi-
visible, the agent will choose to save up for the good if β is above a threshold level βˆ. However,
in empirical field work, researchers are unlikely to know the exact time preference parameters of the
agents concerned, unless extensive surveys or lab experiments have been conducted. In consequence,
a natural question to ask is: For given time preferences, what is the maximum savings level that agents
can reach? In our context, this can be translated to the question which price p the agent is willing to
pay for a good yielding a constant benefit b. Having set up Basu’s benchmark model, this question
is easily answered: The threshold βˆ will be an increasing function of p, so the maximum achievable
price pmax must be an increasing function of β. To see this formally, it can be shown that
Proposition 4. smin is weakly increasing in p
10Basu shows that sopt is weakly increasing in b, and always smaller than smax , yielding an intersection smin = sopt at βmax > βˆ
above which period 1 will save sopt rather than smin.
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Figure 1: Achievable Savings Levels in Autarky
Proposition 5. smax is weakly decreasing in p.
An agent will choose to save for the nondivisible if smin(p, β) ≤ smax(p, β), yielding a unique
threshold pmax (at given β) and a price range p ∈ (1, pmax] for which the good is bought. To see
how p and β relate, consider pmax for a given β. Note that smin(p, β) is weakly decreasing in β and
smax(p, β) is weakly increasing in β. Increasing β to β′ > β will thus shift down smin(p) and shift up
smax(p). As can be seen from Figure 11, the intersection smin = smax shifts to the right, increasing the
threshold pmax to p′max. It can be concluded that pmax(β) is weakly increasing in β.
2.1.2 Equilibrium with a Regular Saver Commitment Product
We are now in a position to look at the effect of a commitment savings product with fixed contri-
butions on an individual who cannot reach his welfare-maximising savings level due to hyperbolic
discounting. The analysis will first look at the effect on the threshold βˆ, and then derive the effect on
the achievable savings level pmax. The commitment savings product is defined in the following way:
1. The agent can choose a fixed per period savings contribution before contributions start.
2. In each period, the agent either pays the contracted-upon contribution, or he “defaults”, in
which case he pays a penalty and receives his accumulated savings back.
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The first assumption will simplify things tremendously, as the agent is not subject to temptation in
the period when he signs the contract. Studies like the SMarT project of Benartzi and Thaler (2004)
show that this may be a plausible approach in practice. The second assumption requires the bank to
have contract enforcing power in the case that the agent defaults in the first period, when there are
no accumulated savings and he needs to make a net payment upon default. For the purposes of our
model, we will assume that the bank has sufficient claims on the agent’s income to ensure that the
penalty is paid. In practice, this may be implemented via a small item of collateral which the bank
holds. A different approach with the same implications is to think of the penalty as a psychological
cost which the agent pays upon default: After bothering to set up a formal savings contract, he may
face some cost of “renegotiation” with himself. Finally, the penalty could be paid via an account
opening fee at the time of signing the contract, which is reimbursed with the first savings contribution
(this case differs slightly in modelling strategy, see footnote X).
To see how regular contributions can help agents to save more, consider an agent who can commit
in period 0 to save a fixed amount s¯ in a designated bank account in both period 1 and 2. Once he
chooses not to contribute s¯ in a period, he pays a penalty D for cancelling the contract but receives
back any accumulated savings. In addition, he is free to save at home independently of his bank
contributions, so we can capture his total savings (in the bank plus at home) transferred from period
t to t + 1 as st. The penalty D is imposed in period 1 if s1 < s¯, and in period 2 if s1 ≥ s¯, s2 < 2s¯.
Assume D < s¯.
Given an exogenous price p of the nondivisible, if the period 0 agent does want the commitment
product, he will choose the welfare-maximising contribution s¯ = p−12 . With s¯ known, backward
induction can be used to solve for the equilibrium.
Period 3
As before, the period 3 agent will buy the good whenever he can afford it, i.e. whenever s2 ≥ p− 1,
and consume any remaining savings.
Period 2
The savings decision of the period 2 self will depend on s1, with a discontinuity at s1 = s¯. Suppose
s1 ≥ s¯: Period 1 has made the required contribution, so period 2 faces a penalty if he does not.
If s1 > s¯, period 1 has left additional savings at home which can be used to make the period 2
contribution. Period 2 will prefer to stick to the contract, thus transferring 2s¯ = p− 1 and purchasing
the good if
u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s1 − D− s2∗) + βu(1+ s2∗)
where s2∗ is the optimal way to split remaining savings (s1 − D) between period 2 and period 3,
conditional on not buying the good:
s2 ∗ (s1) = argmax[u(1+ s1 − D− s2) + βu(1+ s2)]
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subject to 0 ≤ s2 < p− 1. Since the inequality differs from the non-banking case only in the penalty
D, the same proof can be used to show that the nondivisible is bought for any s1 ≥ sBmin(β), where
sBmin(β) is the critical threshold in the banking case. For a given β, this threshold will be strictly
lower than smin(β) in the autarky case: The right-hand side of the inequality decreases when D is
introduced, while the left-hand side stays unchanged. Thus, the inequality will always hold using
the original smin(β), and it will still hold for smin(β)− e. In other words, a lower amount of savings
is needed to incentivise period 2 to purchase the good because the option to just consume savings is
less attractive.
The effect of the penalty disappears for s1 < s¯: Period 1 has already cancelled the contract and
incurred the penalty, so period 2 is no longer committed to contribute s¯. As in autarky, he compares
whether
u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s1 − s2∗) + βu(1+ s2∗)
and purchases the nondivisible if and only if s1 ≥ smin(β). As a result, sBmin(β) = smin(β) for s1 < s¯.
Figure 2 shows that the combined sBmin(β)-function is horizontal between β
′′ and β′′′, where sBmin(β
′′) =
sBmin(β
′′′) = s¯ = p−12 . In this interval, the period 2 agent needs to be given less than s¯ if he faces the
penalty and more than s¯ if he does not. To ensure that he faces the penalty, the period 1 agent needs
to save s1 ≥ s¯ to keep the contract active. Between β′′ and β′′′, the minimum s1 needed to ensure the
good is purchased is thus s¯. 11
It can be concluded that, with the regular saver product, the period 2 agent will prefer to save for
the good if s1 ≥ sBmin(β), and accordingly save s2 = p− 1. For s1 < sBmin(β), he will save s2 ∗ (s1) <
p− 1. The threshold sBmin is weakly lower than the autarky threshold smin. Note that for sBmin(β) > s¯,
the period 2 agent is not willing to make the contracted-upon contribution unless period 1 makes
additional savings at home.
Period 1
As in autarky, period 1’s behaviour is most easily captured by looking at the maximum s1 that she is
willing to save in order to receive the good. In contrast to autarky, she now incurs the penalty D if
s1 < s¯. In the region s1 ≥ s¯, the agent prefers to save for the nondivisible if
u(1− s1) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ u(1− D) + 2βu(1).
This condition is identical to the autarky case apart from D on the right-hand side. Note that if the
agent does not want to save for the good (i.e. is not willing to pay the necessary s1), she will always
prefer to save s1 = 0 and incur the penalty.12 In consequence, the agent will transfer the necessary
s1 as long as s1 ≤ sBmax(β), where sBmax(β) is the critical threshold in the banking case. Since the left-
hand side of the inequality is identical to the autarky case and the right-hand side decreases in D,
11Note that period 1 will never save in the region s¯−D ≤ s1 < s¯, as the contribution made plus the penalty incurred exceeds
s¯. This does not affect smin, but it is captured in smax .
12The alternative is to transfer s¯ just to delay the penalty, but given D < s¯ and a desire to smooth consumption, we know
u(1− D) + βu(1) > u(1− s¯) + βu(1+ s¯− D).
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the inequality always holds using the original smax(β), and it still holds for smax(β) + e. Thus, the
resulting sBmax(β) will be strictly higher than smax(β) for s1 ≥ s¯.
Finally, consider the case where necessary savings are s1 < s¯, i.e. period 1 could ensure the good
is bought even if he does not contribute s¯. In this case, he faces a penalty whether or not he saves for
the good. He compares
u(1− s1 − D) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ u(1− D) + 2βu(1),
which differs from the original inequality in the penalty D on both sides. The resulting threshold
sBmax(β) now turns out to be lower than the original threshold smax(β). To see this, note that with a
strictly concave utility function, the utility loss from D when starting at consumption level 1− s1 is
bigger than the utility loss from D when starting at consumption level 1: u(1− s1)− u(1− s1 −D) >
u(1)− u(1− D) for s1 > 0. In other words, the penalty D hurts the agent more when he is saving
than when he is not. With the left-hand side decreasing more than the right-hand side, willingness to
save will decrease, shifting the sBmax(β)-curve below the original smax(β)-curve for s1 < s¯.
Figure 2 shows that the two parts of the sBmax(β)-curve combine with a vertical rather than a hor-
izontal line. To see why, consider extending the lower part of sBmax(β) to the s¯-line. For any β in this
range, e.g. for βˆB, smax is below s¯ if the agent has to pay the penalty along with her savings, and
above s¯ if she does not. Since she does not have the pay the penalty for s1 ≥ s¯, the maximum that
she is willing to pay is given by the upper part of the sBmax(β)-curve. The vertical part of sBmax(β)
results from period 1 never choosing s1 in the region sˆ < s1 < s¯, where sˆ is defined such that the
upper part of sBmax(β) reaches s¯ at the same β′ where the lower part of sBmax(β) reaches sˆ (see Figure
2). Intuitively, if the necessary s1 is s¯− e, period 1 is better off to save s¯ voluntarily instead of paying
s1 + D > s¯. Furthermore, it can be shown that sˆ < s¯− D: Consider a situation where the necessary
s1is s1 = s¯− D − e. Rather than incurring the penalty and paying a total of s1 + D = s¯− e, he will
prefer to save s1 = s¯, which costs e more in period 1 but yields an added benefit of D + e in period
2. Summarizing period 1’s behaviour, he incurs the penalty D when β < β′, with smax given by the
lower part of sBmax(β). For β ≥ β′, he is willing to save s1 ≥ s¯, with smax by the upper part of sBmax(β).
Equilibrium with a Regular Saver Product
The nondivisible is purchased whenever sBmax(β) ≥ sBmin(β), which occurs for any β ∈ [βˆB, 1]. In
Figure 2.1.2, the critical βˆB is lower than the threshold βˆ obtained from smin and smax in autarky:
The nondivisible good can be purchased for a larger range of β when agents use the commitment
product. For β ∈ [βˆB, βˆ), the regular saver product is welfare-enhancing as the nondivisible can be
purchased with the product but not without it. The second relevant factor for welfare analysis is how
evenly savings are spread across period 1 and 2. Note that in spite of the agent signing a contract
to contribute the welfare-maximising amounts s1 = s¯, s2 = 2s¯, the equilibrium amount of savings
need not adhere to this schedule. However, it can be shown that given a sufficiently large penalty, the
11
Figure 2: Equilibrium with a Regular Saver Product
regular saver product weakly decreases the difference between equilibrium s1 and s¯, thus increasing
welfare by smoothing consumption.
Proposition 6. Given a sufficiently large penalty D ≥ s¯− smin(1), introduction of the regular saver product
increases the range of parameters where the nondivisible good can be purchased, i.e. βˆB < βˆ holds.
Proposition 7. Given D ≥ s¯− smin(1), the regular saver product weakly decreases |s¯− s1| for all β ∈ [βˆB, 1].
The situation looks different for low values of β, where the commitment product may even hurt
agents: First, for β such that the nondivisible is bought neither with nor without commitment, agents
are worse off as they pay a penalty for cancelling the contract. Second, if the intersection sBmax(β) =
sBmin(β) occurs on the lower part of the s
B
max(β)-curve, then βˆ < βˆB, so commitment decreases the
range of β where the nondivisible can be bought. Intuitively, this happens when the agent was in
an autarky equilibrium where the good was purchased with a large share of the savings burden on
period 2. With the commitment product, if he is not willing to jump to s1 = s¯, he incurs the penalty, is
willing to save even less in period 1, and may thus no longer be able to buy the good. The method to
determine whether βˆB < βˆ for a specific combination of u(ct), D, p, b is therefore to check whether
at the autarky threshold βˆ, the agent is willing to pay s1 ≥ s¯ when subjected to the penalty. If yes,
the upper part of the sBmax(β)-curve applies, and we can conclude βˆB < βˆ. Another way of stating the
same criterion is to check whether β′ < βˆ.




, and for βˆ ≤ β < βˆB.
For βˆB ≤ β < βˆ, the product will enable him to buy the nondivisible, and for β ∈ [βˆB, 1], the product
will bring savings contributions weakly closer to the welfare-maximising s1 = s¯. The implications for
12
Figure 3: Achievable Savings Levels with a Regular Saver Product
take-up are straightforward: Since the contract is signed in period 0 rather than in period 1, the agent
will choose the regular saver product whenever it increases his welfare, i.e. if and only if β ∈ [βˆB, 1].13
Achievable Savings Levels with a Regular Saver Product
Returning to the original question which effect a regular saver product has on the maximum achiev-
able savings level pmax for given time preferences β, it is analogous to show that pmax increases as
long as the penalty is high enough. First, to ensure that D < s¯ = p−12 is true for all p, it is convenient
to define D as a fraction of s¯, D = λ p−12 , λ ∈ (0, 1). Second, Section 2.1.1 has derived that smax
weakly decreases in p, while smin weakly increases in p. The effect of the penalty on the two curves is
analogous to the effect shown for variable preferences β:
sBmin ≡ min{s1 | u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s1 − D− s2∗) + βu(1+ s2∗)} for s1 ≥ s¯
Consider the above inequality at previous levels of smin and smax. When the penalty D is introduced,
the right-hand side decreases, so the inequality will hold for pmax + e. Thus the previous smin holds
at higher levels of p, shifting the smin-curve to the right (see Figure 3). For s1 < s¯, the contract has
been cancelled in period 1, and period 2 no longer faces a penalty, thus the original smin applies.
sBmax ≡ max{s1 | u(1− s1) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ u(1− D) + 2βu(1)} for s1 ≥ s¯
sBmax ≡ max{s1 | u(1− s1 − D) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ u(1− D) + 2βu(1)} for s1 < s¯
For smax, the same logic shows that the upper part of the smax-curve shifts right, while the lower part
shifts left below the original smax due to concavity of u(ct).
Analogously to the criterion for βˆB < βˆ, the new threshold pBmax will be higher than pmax if and
only if, at the original pmax, the agent is willing to pay s1 ≥ s¯ when subjected to the penalty – i.e.
13A possible extension could make the optimal choice of s¯ a function of β. A lower choice of s¯ for low β may prevent the case
of βˆ < βˆB. Purchasing the good would then require additional savings above 2s¯.
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he jumps to the upper part of the sBmax-curve. Note that this holds irrespective of the shape of the
sBmin-curve (as long as it increases), and of whether the original equilibrium s1 is above or below s¯. As
with βˆB, whether pBmax > pmax depends critically on the size of the penalty. The bigger the penalty,
the larger the shift in smax, the higher the likelihood that the agent would rather pay s¯ at the original
pmax instead of incurring the penalty. Trivially, at D = s¯, any p < 3 is achievable.
To summarize the take-up decision in the scenario with fixed β and variable p, the period 0 agent
will adopt the product whenever it is welfare-maximising. This is the case whenever 2u( 3−p2 ) +
u(b) ≥ 3u(1), i.e. receiving the benefit b is worth paying p, and when p ∈ [1, pBmax], i.e. the product
enables him to buy the nondivisible and smooth his savings contributions relative to buying the good
in autarky.14
Extension: Adding Relatives’ Claims
So far the model has assumed that the individual has full control over his assets. This may not be
true in reality. A very crude way to capture this is to assume there is a negative return on savings
kept at home, i.e. period 2 receives µs1 and period 3 receives µs2, where µ < 1. In autarky, the smin-
curve will shift upwards, as the left-hand side of the inequality decreases more than the right-hand
side due to concave utility. Further, smax shifts down, thus increasing the threshold βˆ (and decreasing
pmax). The good can be bought less often with relatives’ claims, which is intuitive given that saving
is less attractive with negative returns. When a regular saver product is introduced, period 2 receives
µ(s1 − s¯) + s¯ if s1 ≥ s¯, and µs1 otherwise. For s1 ≥ s¯, the product now causes smin to shift down
for two reasons: Because the penalty D makes not saving less attractive, and because the product
increases returns on s¯ from µto 1. For the same two reasons, smax shifts up, provided that s1 ≥ s¯. For
s1 < s¯, smin is unchanged relative to autarky, while smax shifts below its autarky level as the penalty
appears on both sides of the inequality. The conclusion is the same as before: If, at the original βˆ
(or pmax), period 1 is willing to pay s¯ when subjected to the penalty, then the commitment product
leads to βˆB < βˆ, respectively pBmax > pmax. In contrast to the situation without relatives’ claims, the
intervals ˆ[βB, βˆ] and [pmax, p
B
max] are likely to be larger, as smin decreases more and smax increases
more in response to the product. In other words, relative to the original model, the product enables
more agents to achieve higher savings levels due to its added benefit of protecting savings from
relatives’ claims. Finally, note that the banking equilibrium will occur at the point s1 = s¯ more often
than without relatives’ claims, i.e. horizontal and vertical parts of the curves are larger: While in the
original model, the only pressure was not to save less than s¯, now there is added pressure to not save
more than s¯ either in order to avoid negative returns to saving at home.
14As a possible extension, consider the case where the penalty is only enforceable in period 2 as a deduction from savings,
but not in period 1. Instead, the agent pays D as an opening fee in period 0, which is reimbursed upon payment of s1 ≥ s¯. For
the period 0 agent, this will imply an additional condition β ∈ [βmin, 1] for take-up as he now faces temptation. The condition
for sBmin is unchanged, while the condition for s
B
max becomes
u(1− s1 + D) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ (1+ 2β)u(1) for s1 ≥ s¯
u(1− s1) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ (1+ 2β)u(1) for s1 < s¯
The smax-curve shifts up for s1 ≥ s¯ relative to autarky and stays at its autarky level for s1 < s¯. Hence, the results of the model
hold.
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Figure 4: Numerical Illustration: Achievable Savings Levels
2.2 Numerical Illustration
For illustrative purposes, consider the following parameter specifications. Note that the penalty D
has been set to D = 0.5s¯ to ensure that D < s¯ is true for all p.








Requiring that smax ≥ smin at given β and solving numerically for pmax yields maximum achiev-
able savings levels, which are illustrated in Figure 2.2 for both autarky and when using the regular
saver product. Note that by the condition 2u( 3−p2 ) + u(b) ≥ 3u(1), the maximum price at which
the good is welfare-improving is p¯ = 11/7 (the dotted line in Figure 2.2). Further, it can be shown
that the optimal contribution s1 = s¯ is reached more frequently. Hence, the period 0 agent desires
commitment for any β ≤ 1 given an achievable price p ≤ min {pmax, 11/7}.
3 The Data
The previous chapter has attempted to provide a theoretical foundation of why individuals subject to
short-term consumption temptations and financial claims from relatives may benefit from a savings
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product which enables them to commit to fixed contributions every period. Section 4 will look at the
empirical results of one such product: The Long Term Savings (LTS) product offered by SafeSave, an
MFI located in Dhaka, Bangladesh. SafeSave, which was founded by microfinance researcher Stuart
Rutherford in 1996, aims to provide day-to-day money management services such as basic savings
and loan instruments to the poor.15 In June 2009, SafeSave introduced the LTS product, enabling clients
to save either 50Tk or a multiple of 100Tk (about U.S. $1.3) each month for a chosen contract length of
3, 5, 7 or 10 years. A particular feature of SafeSave is branchless banking - i.e. “field officers” visit each
client’s house every working day to collect general savings, and once a month LTS savings. The only
time clients need to visit a bank branch is to open an account (general or LTS), or to take withdrawals
or loans in excess of 500Tk. These field officers informed clients about the new LTS product in June
2009.
The analysis in this paper focuses on the 333 clients who opened an LTS account at a particular
SafeSave branch (Bauniaband branch, the first to offer LTS) between June 2009 and February 2010,
conditional on having had a general savings account since August 2008 or longer.16 The variable of
interest is the increase in clients’ savings contributions after LTS adoption: Do clients save more when
they use LTS? Data is available on clients’ general savings level plus LTS savings as of 31 August and
31 January each year, between August 2006 and January 2010. This makes it possible to compare
savings contributions made during the five month period from August to January, for the years 2006
to 2009.17 During the last of these four periods, from August 2009 to January 2010, LTS was available.
This paper explores the variation contained in the timing of LTS adoption: Those who adopted LTS
soon after its introduction in June 2009 were “treated” with the product for the full five month period
of interest. Those clients who adopted LTS later in 2009 received “partial treatment” in the sense that
they used LTS for only a fraction of the period from August 2009 to January 2010. The analysis then
compares whether the savings contributions of “fully treated” individuals increased more relative to
previous years’ contributions than the savings of “partially treated” or untreated individuals did. The
obvious difficulty with approaching LTS as a treatment is that assignment into the treatment group
does not occur randomly, as individuals select into the treatment group by adopting early. The effects
that can arise from such endogeneity of treatment are discussed in detail in section 4.2 and Appendix
A.
While the theoretical model described in section 2 provides a plausible foundation for the empir-
ical analysis to follow, two areas of departure from the theory are worth mentioning: First, interest
rates. Interest rates for LTS are 7, 8, 9, and 10 percent for a 3, 5, 7, and 10 year contract, respectively,
where the average chosen contract length is 5.3 years. With inflation ranging around 9 percent in
2008 and 2009, this implies the real interest rate on LTS is currently negative or roughly zero. Hence,
it seems unlikely that clients adopted LTS to increase the size of the pie, rather than for its commit-
ment features. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that individuals simply needed to save
for the future and chose LTS to evade inflation, not because they wanted or needed commitment. It
15For more details on SafeSave, see Rutherford (1999) and www.safesave.org.
16Of originally 334 clients, one was excluded as an outlier, as her savings in 2009 deviated from the average in 2009 by -19.6
standard deviations, or -32,709Tk.
17Note that contributions made during January to August periods are not considered, as they span seven months and may
contain seasonal effects.
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is helpful to note that the general savings account pays 6 percent interest without any commitment.18
Given the uncertainty of most slum dwellers’ incomes and consumption needs, it seems doubtful
whether a client who does not desire commitment would sign a 5-year contract for an additional 2
percent of interest.
Secondly, the penalty upon cancelling the LTS contract differs from the simple structure assumed
in the model: If a client is three months or less behind on payments, a “service fee” needs to be paid
to catch up on payments. If he is more than three months behind, the LTS contract is cancelled, and
the penalty imposed is that he loses all LTS interest payments above the general account interest rate,
with retrospective effect since he opened his LTS. In terms of our theory, the three months delay can
be captured by thinking of one period as three months. The penalty for cancelling LTS, however,
is not an actual penalty, in the sense that agents receive the same returns which they would have
received, had they never joined LTS. If agents are rational, this will reduce the efficacy of the product.
For behavioural agents who exhibit reference dependence and loss aversion, the penalty would still
be effective: While holding an LTS, individuals will adjust their reference point to the higher interest
payments they believe to accumulate over time, and will be reluctant to give them up. The fact that
only 8 out of 333 clients in our sample cancelled their LTS during the period of observation supports
this explanation.
4 Estimation
4.1 The Differences-in-Differences Approach
An obvious first step to estimate the effect that LTS has on client’s savings is to look at how much early
adopters saved between August 2009 and January 2010, i.e. while using LTS, and compare this to their
savings during earlier August to January periods. To isolate time effects, this change in savings can
be compared to the change in savings of a control group during the same time period. The resulting
differences-in-differences (DD) estimate can be interpreted as a causal treatment effect only under the
strong assumption that the treatment group would have evolved identically to the control group, had
they not been treated (i.e. had they not used LTS). We will discuss the plausibility of this assumption
in Section 4.2. The first part of the analysis considers all clients who adopted LTS between June 2009
and September 2009 (“early adopters”) as “treated”, while those clients who adopted LTS between
October 2009 and February 2010 (“late adopters”) are used as a control group. Note that LTS deposits
must be made on the 20th of each month, and “adopting LTS in September” means that clients chose
to first contribute to LTS on 20th of September. Hence, clients adopting LTS in September can be
considered as “fully treated” in the sense that they contributed on all LTS payment dates between 31
August 2009 and 31 January 2010.
Table I presents descriptive statistics of clients’ characteristics (as far as available), the LTS contract
options they chose, and their average savings contributions by group. Column (1) of Table II presents
the regression estimates of a DD approach generalized to multiple time periods, which at this point
18This interest rate of 6 percent requires a savings balance of at least 1000Tk – a criterion that 285 of 333 clients in our sample
satisfied as of August 2009.
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should be interpreted as correlations only. The regression equation is
Sit = α+ γTi + λt + βDit + eit
where Sit are an individual’s savings contributions (general plus LTS savings) in period t, i.e. the
difference between their savings balances in August of year t and January of year t+ 1. Ti is a dummy
that switches on for individuals who adopted LTS in or before September 2009, λt is a vector of year
dummies for 2006-2009, and Dit is a treatment dummy that switches on for observations of treated
individuals in 2009. The coefficient β shows that on average, early adopters increased their savings
contributions by 523 Tk (about $7) more relative to past year savings than late adopters did during
the treatment period. At average contributions of 290Tk in the previous year, this implies an increase
in savings of 180 percent. Note that the treatment group coefficient γ is not significant – i.e. early
adopters did not save more (in contribution levels) than late adopters before LTS was introduced.
The cut-off between early and late adopters may seem arbitrary, given that joining LTS was pos-
sible every month. As an alternative, we can generalize the concept of a treatment and a control
group to allow for separate treatment groups depending on month of LTS entry. This allows us to test
whether savings increase in the number of months that a client used LTS – in other words, whether
the coefficient on treatment in the savings equation increases in the number of months that a client
was “treated” with LTS.19 The regression equation becomes
Sit = α+ γmTi + λt + βmDit + eit
where m indexes months of treatment. The equation contains a vector of treatment group effects γm
(dummy Ti is one if individual i was “treated” m months), a vector of time effects λt, and a vector of
treatment effects βm, where Dit is a vector of dummies that switches on for observations in 2009 for
individuals treated for m months. Treatment varies at the individual level, and we explicitly assume
that observations are independent at the individual level, i.e. there is no group structure to the time-
individual specific errors eit (see Section 4.3 for concerns regarding the error structure).
Column (1) of Table III reports the regression estimates of a DD with five treatment groups, rang-
ing from two to six months of treatment. One and zero months of treatment (January and February
adopters) have been combined as a control group. The six months group (June-August adopters) has
been added to account for possible differences between those who already held an LTS when the pe-
riod of observation started on 31 August, and those who only joined LTS on the first relevant payment
day on 20th September. The regression in column (1) shows an even stronger correlation of savings
with treatment than before: While the effects for six, five and four months are highly significant, the
coefficient on treatment peaks at 1177Tk ($15) for five months treatment, i.e. September adopters, and
then roughly decreases in level and significance as duration of treatment drops. It is interesting to ob-
serve that all group and time effects are insignificant – suggesting that levels of savings contributions
were roughly the same across groups before treatment.
19This is similar in concept (but much simpler in implementation) to the approach of Duflo (2001), who showed that a higher
degree of exposure to a school construction program in Indonesia had increased effects on wages and education.
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TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Early Adopters Late Adopters All
Age 30.6 32.9 31.4
Female 89.7 89 89.5
Occupation (percent)
Housewife 66.5 52.3 61.9
Small Business 6.7 15.6 9.6
Private Service 11.6 9.1 10.8
Handicrafts 6.7 12.8 8.7
Student 8.5 10.2 9.0











Contract Length (years) 5.1 5.76 5.3
Monthly Deposit (Taka) 210 235 218
Purpose of LTS Contract
Education 56 51.4 54.6
Ornaments 1.4 1.8 1.5
Land Purchase 5.8 9.2 6.9
House Construction 1.3 0.9 1.2
Medical Treatment 4.9 0.9 3.6
Marriage 10.7 12.8 11.4
Business 19.9 23 20.8
Mean Savings Contributions
Aug 2006 - Jan 2007 318 197 277
Aug 2007 - Jan 2008 323 301 316
Aug 2008 - Jan 2009 292 285 290
Aug 2009 - Jan 2010 1064 499 879
Observations 224 109 333
Notes: 1) “Early Adopters” are all clients who adopted an LTS contract at Bauniaband
branch between June and September 2009. “Late adopters” are all clients who adopted an
LTS contract at Bauniaband branch between October 2009 and February 2010.
2) While income data was not available on client level, bank staff estimate average monthly household income
between 5000 and 6000 Tk.
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TABLE II: IMPACT OF A REGULAR SAVER PRODUCT
Dependent Variable: Change in Total Savings from August (t) to January (t+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment group*2009 523.1*** 654.6*** 750.9***
(195) (209) (264)
Treatment group 42.45 39.90 148.3
(58.3) (61.9) (240)








Interaction Area*2009 NO YES YES
Time effects YES YES YES
Occupation FE NO YES YES
Observations 1185 1185 1185
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.08
Robust SEs YES YES NO
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Note: Exchange rate is about 100Tk for US $1.3.
4.2 Endogeneity Concerns
The previous section pointed out that “treatment” in the form of early LTS adoption is highly corre-
lated with higher savings, but has refrained from making any statements of causal nature. A neces-
sary requirement to make causal statements in an OLS regression is that the coefficient of interest can
be estimated consistently, which in turn requires that regressors are uncorrelated with the error term.
In our case, this requirement asks that treatment is orthogonal to anything that determines savings.
This may not be plausible considering that treatment is self-selected, i.e. there may be omitted vari-
ables in the error term which cause individuals to both adopt the product early, and to save more.
Much of the appeal of DD estimation comes from the fact that it avoids many of the endogeneity
problems commonly associated with comparisons between heterogeneous individuals: In particular,
omitted variables that are either time-invariant or group-invariant will not affect the validity of a DD
estimation, even if they are correlated with treatment or take-up. Starting from the equation
Sit = αi + λt + βDit + γzi + eit
where zi is unobserved, the classic two-period DD estimator βˆ = ∆S¯Tt − ∆S¯Ct differences out any
effects that are constant either across time or across individuals. As an illustration, suppose that
higher income causes early take-up, and higher income also causes higher savings levels, but it does
not cause different savings time trends. Then the effect of income is time-invariant, and thus income
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TABLE III: IMPACT OF A REGULAR SAVER PRODUCT – MULTIPLE TREATMENT GROUPS
Dependent Variable: Change in Total Savings from August (t) to January (t+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Effects
Six months treatment 759.2*** 863.9*** 816.3**
(262) (275) (331)
Five months treatment 1177*** 1265*** 1094**
(404) (410) (474)
Four months treatment 963.6*** 885.9*** -0.476
(334) (319) (533)
Three months treatment 306.3 263.4 210.2
(416) (422) (632)
Two months treatment 518.7 529.7 851.0
(435) (445) (755)
Group Effects
Six months 51.44 46.14 -5.095
(61.0) (67.4) (298)
Five months -54.91 -77.43 -269.6
(152) (159) (443)
Four months -58.76 -96.10 -1125**
(128) (134) (507)
Three months 127.3 113.5 53.23
(109) (111) (577)
Two months -154.0 -103.9 286.6
(147) (160) (735)
Group specific trends
Trend (6 months) 24.75
(132)
Trend (5 months) 90.97
(195)
Trend (4 months) 478.5**
(222)
Trend (3 months) 27.98
(257)








Interaction Area*2009 NO YES YES
Time effects YES YES YES
Occupation FE NO YES YES
Observations 1185 1185 1185
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.10
Robust SEs YES YES NO
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Note: Exchange rate is about 100Tk for US $1.3.
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will not bias the DD estimator. The real problem for the DD approach adopted are unobservables
which cause both early adoption and a change in the savings time trend. The following decomposition
for the two-period case illustrates this: The treatment effect that we are ultimately interested in is
E[STit − SNTit | T]
where E[SNTit | T] are the expected savings of a treatment group individual in absence of treatment.
The DD coefficient that we estimate converges to
E[STit − SNTi, t−1 | T]− E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT]
which can be decomposed into
E[STit − SNTit | T]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Treatment E f f ect
+ E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | T]− E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Bias
.
In other words, the identifying assumption is that
E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | T] = E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT].
The estimator is biased if the (counterfactual) change in savings for the treatment group absent treat-
ment is different from the change in savings for the control group.20 Given the lack of a suitable
instrumental variable, this paper will not be able to fully solve the endogeneity problem. Instead,
the remainder of this section will take a closer look at the selection bias by suggesting possible dif-
ferences between early and late adopters, controlling for them where possible, and discussing their
implications for savings behaviour.
Shedding Light on LTS Adoption
The most obvious step in analysing take-up is to test whether observable characteristics can predict
the timing of LTS adoption. Table IV presents the results of regressing LTS entry month on age,
occupation, gender and area of residence. Likewise, it may be interesting to look at correlations of
contract choices, i.e. whether early adopters chose higher monthly contributions. Table V presents a
regression of entry month on other choices – which is purely to illustrate correlations and should be
interpreted as such.
Table V suggests that early adopters were more likely to choose shorter contracts, but committed
to roughly similar monthly contributions. They also opened their general bank accounts at the same
time. Table V reveals that while age, gender and occupation had little effect on adoption timing,
the area where clients live strongly influenced when they took up the product. The importance of
area may seem striking, considering that SafeSave only operates within a one kilometre radius of
a bank branch (in this case, Bauniaband branch), so the areas considered are relatively small and
20See Besley and Case (2000) for a clear discussion of endogenous treatment and possible remedies in the case of policy
choice.
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TABLE IV TABLE V
PREDICTING LTS ADOPTION TIMING LTS CONTRACT CHOICES
Dependent Variable:
LTS Entry Month (1=June 2009)
Dependent Variable:
LTS Entry Month (1=June 2009)
Female -0.0859 Quarter of bank entry -0.00972
(0.55) (1=2000Q1) (0.016)
Age -0.00975 Contract length (yrs) 0.161**
(0.061) (0.070)
Age² 0.000243 Monthly deposit (Tk) 0.0000952
(0.00077) (0.00088)
Occupation FE Purpose of LTS contract
Housewife 0.151 Marriage -0.573
(0.65) (0.54)
Handicrafts 0.972 Education -0.710*
(0.77) (0.38)
Small Business 0.462 Ornaments 0.172
(0.80) (1.37)
Private Service 0.0203 Land Purchase 0.0270
(0.75) (0.67)
Area of Residence House Construction -0.194
Bauniaband Block B -1.302*** (1.38)
(0.43) Medical Treatment -1.413*
Bauniaband Block C -1.396*** (0.85)
(0.42) Constant 3.558***
Bauniaband Block D -0.587 (0.63)
(0.49) Observations 333
Bauniaband Block E -0.574 R-squared 0.04
(0.48) *significant at 10 percent;
Kurmitola 2.374*** **significant at 5 percent;
(0.90) ***significant at 1 percent.
Mirpur 1.617* Notes: The omitted category for





*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5
percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Notes: The omitted category for occupation is
student. The omitted category for area is
Bauniaband Block A.
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close together. At first sight, this may look like an omitted variable bias – for instance, area may
be correlated with income, which may influence take-up. While we do not have individual income
data, observational evidence from field officers who visit each client every day suggests that all areas
are comparatively poor. Second, insights such as those from Bertrand et al. (2004b) suggest that
situational factors such as walking distance to the branch (to sign an LTS contract) may be important
for take-up. Walking distances are Block A (5min), Block B (10min), Block C (16min), Block D (12min),
Block E (12min), Kurmitola and Mirpur (5-15min). With Block C being the farthest from the branch
and at the same time the earliest to adopt LTS, the distance explanation does not seem very likely.
There are various other explanations for a “patchwork pattern” of adoption, such as herding be-
haviour and other mechanisms of technology adoption.21 Appendix A discusses these explanations
in detail and shows that, in particular with herding behaviour, random factors may lead to a prof-
itable innovation spreading very quickly in one area, and not at all or with considerable delay in
another area, even if individuals are completely homogeneous in their savings preferences (implying
zero selection bias). Factors which may determine adoption timing independent of area include dif-
ferent degrees of risk aversion and the amount of benefit which individuals derive from the product:
Suppose information about the manageability of LTS is a public good. The theory in this paper then
suggests that early adopters may be those who can reach their desired savings goal p with LTS but
not without it, i.e. β ∈ [βˆB, βˆ) – they derive the largest benefit from the product and have the highest
stake in learning about it. Individuals who could have reached their p in autarky, but at less smooth
savings contributions, may still adopt LTS, but wait for others to adopt first. Appendix A elaborates
on this argument and shows that the implications for a possible selection bias are generally ambigu-
ous, instead pointing towards heterogeneous treatment effects.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to disentangle further which factors were at work in
adoption timing. Most plausibly, it was a mixture of them plus some factors which have not been
discussed – like shocks that occurred simultaneous with treatment. In the end, what matters for our
estimate of the treatment effect is whether the factors which determined adoption also determined
savings trends absent treatment. The following subsection will attempt to control for two sources of
selection bias.
4.3 Adjusting the Estimation Strategy
How can we eliminate or at least reduce a possible selection bias in our analysis to isolate the treat-
ment effect? First, we can control for the effect of area by interacting the treatment period (2009)
with the area dummies. Suppose time-individual specific effects were such that clients in areas who
adopted early (like Block C) would have increased their savings even without treatment. Early adop-
tion leads to disproportional representation of these clients in the treatment group and biases the
estimated treatment effect. Including 2009*area as a control will eliminate this effect. Column (2) of
Tables II and III show that including these area interactions further increases the treatment effect, and
suggests that early adoption blocks B, D and E would have decreased their savings absent treatment.
21Compare Besley and Case (1994) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995).
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A second general source of selection bias that we can control for are pre-existing trends. In other
words, if early adopters are different from late adopters in a way that causes them to follow different
savings time trends before treatment, we can control for this by including a time trend specifically
for the treatment group. Column (3) of Tables II and III show that the treatment effects are generally
robust to including treatment-specific time trends. Time trends are mostly insignificant, suggesting
that savings patterns of the treatment and the control group were comparable before treatment. Nev-
ertheless, the power of this test may be low given the small sample size and the availability of only
four years of data. Clients treated for four months (i.e. October entrants) constitute a special case
as their treatment effect is fully absorbed by a large negative group effect and a large positive time
trend. This is almost certainly due to the fact that the regressors explain only four periods of data and
would disappear with a longer time series.
Unfortunately, an important source of bias remains in time-individual specific shocks which oc-
curred simultaneous with LTS introduction: For instance, if there was a change in circumstance for a
particular group of people which caused them to both adopt early and increase their savings (absent
treatment), then the estimate of the treatment effect is biased upwards. Unless these shocks target
specific age, occupation or area groups, the scarce nature of the data will not allow us to control for
the resulting bias. As a consequence, the treatment regressor is plausibly still correlated with the
time-individual specific error. The logical next step is an instrumental variable analysis – but lacking
a suitable instrument, this step has to be postponed to a point when more comprehensive data is
available.
Concerns about Standard Errors
After discussing at length a possible bias of the treatment effect estimator, it is worth taking a closer
look at the accuracy of the standard errors. Bertrand et al. (2004a) point out that serial correlation
in the dependent variable severely biases standard errors in many DD analyses: If the dependent
variable is positively correlated, OLS overstates the amount of information contained in the data
and thus understates standard errors. This bias is particularly severe if the treatment variable is
of a “switch-on” nature and thus itself serially correlated. The bias increases in the length of the
time series. Applying these factors to the present analysis, it seems that serial correlation can be
ruled out as a significant source of bias: The dependent variable, savings contributions, is the first
difference obtained from savings balances. Unless savings balance is an explosive time series, savings
contributions will not exhibit positive serial correlation. If savings balance does not have a unit root
but exhibits autocorrelation of 0 < ρ < 1, savings contributions will be negatively correlated, leading
to an overstatement of standard errors. However, the time span of the data is short (4 periods) and
ends after the treatment period, preventing autocorrelation of treatment. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that serial correlation of any sign had a significant effect on standard errors.
Another frequent concern in the DD literature is clustering of the error terms. Grouped error terms
are a concern when the outcome of interest varies at individual level while treatment varies only at
group level.22 This is not the case here, as both savings and treatment vary for each individual.
22See Angrist and Pischke (2009), Chapter 8.2.
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A final concern addressed here is heteroscedasticity of regression residuals, which may result
from heteroscedastic errors in the true model, or simply from a nonlinear conditional expectation
function E[Sit | Dit, Xit]. While robust standard errors improve on conventional ones asymptotically,
Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that when heteroscedasticity is modest, robust standard errors are
more biased than OLS errors. They propose a rule-of-thumb to use the maximum of conventional
and robust standard errors, which has been applied throughout the analysis: For every regression
column in Tables II and III, the maximum of conventional and robust standard errors was reported,
with the choice of errors indicated in the last row of the table.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
This paper has presented some first empirical evidence on the effect of a commitment savings product
with fixed periodic contributions in a slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The analysis indicates that clients
who used the product during the entire observation period increased their savings significantly rel-
ative to clients who only used the product for a part of the observation period. I also find that the
effect of the product is significant for four or more months of treatment.
In attempting to understand the nature of the endogeneity, the paper finds a significant effect of
area on adoption timing, but no correlation of adoption timing with other savings choices such as
monthly contribution or bank entry timing. I also estimate that early and late adopters follow the
same savings trends before treatment. A story of herding behaviour or other technology adoption
mechanisms would be consistent with this evidence, explaining differences in adoption timing with-
out necessarily implying a selection bias. However, the endogeneity problem cannot be fully resolved
due to possible unobservable time-individual specific effects.
The theoretical model presented in the first part further suggests that heterogeneity of treat-
ment effects may be an issue: While the benefit of the product may consist in reaching a previously
unattainable savings goal for some individuals, it may simply consist in smoothing savings contribu-
tions for others.
The objective of the paper is to provide a motivation for future research into regular saver prod-
ucts, and to tackle the plethora of questions it does not answer: First, a randomized controlled ex-
periment would help to account for unobserved determinants of participation by giving the product
only to a fraction of those who want it, and using the others as a control group. Second, the present
analysis lacks data on individuals’ time preferences. Surveys or lab experiments are needed to iden-
tify individuals’ time preferences as well as the strength of the social claims on their savings, in order
to link hyperbolic discounting and relatives claims’ to a demand for regular saver products. Third,
it is desirable to more explicitly compare the performance of different types of commitment savings
products – e.g. high frequency versus low frequency deposit products (daily versus monthly con-
tributions), versus the pure withdrawal-restriction products which have been a subject of academic
interest in recent years.
An important aim of this strand of research has to be the advancement of microfinance products
which are tailored specifically to the needs of the poor. Examples such as that of Bank Rakyat In-
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donesia, who has 16 million low-income depositors versus two million borrowers,23 and the famous
Grameen bank, who holds $1.6 in savings deposits for every dollar it lends, illustrates that microfi-
nance reality has long realized the importance of savings.
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Appendix A: Explaining Adoption Timing
Section 4.2 has pointed out that area of residence strongly influenced when clients took up the prod-
uct. However, early adoption areas do not seem richer than others and are not closer to the bank
branch. One possible factor at work may be a herding behaviour story in the style of Banerjee (1992):
Consider homogeneous individuals who decide in a sequential fashion whether or not to adopt LTS.
The sequential decision process could be due to reasons exogenous to savings, e.g. because families
need to find time to sit down at the kitchen table and solve the optimization problem whether or not
they want to commit to a 5 year contract.24 Assume there is a network structure within each block
or area (but not between areas): Communication between neighbours is good enough that agents
know whether someone in their block has chosen to i) adopt, ii) not adopt, iii) is yet undecided. Ev-
eryone has a private signal whether the LTS product is good or bad for them: “Good” means it will
be manageable with their budget, and will improve their situation. “Bad” means it will prove to be
unmanageable, taking away slack from their budget, causing transaction cost and withdrawal fees,
and constrain them until they decide to cancel it without reaping any returns. Assume further that
the true return to the product is the same for everyone and positive, and that a large majority of indi-
viduals (say, 90 percent) receive a good signal. Finally, add a tie-breaking rule that someone who is
indifferent will not bother to go to the bank to adopt the product.
Suppose the first two individuals who decide receive a good signal. The first individual will see
only his signal and adopt. The second individual will observe the first’s choice, conclude that his
signal must have been positive, and adopt as well. If someone with a bad signal follows, he will see
the first two’s choice, discard his own signal, and adopt. In a similar fashion, the entire block will
adopt the product regardless of their signals.
Suppose now the first individual has a bad signal, and will not adopt. The second individual will
observe this, conclude that the first had a bad signal and weigh this against his own signal. Even if
he had a good signal himself, he will be indifferent, and will therefore not adopt. The third person
sees that the first two did not adopt, and will do the same. Likewise, no one in the block adopts.
The consequence is that even with completely homogeneous individuals, a profitable innova-
tion may spread very quickly in one area, and not at all or with considerable delay in another area,
depending on the signals of the first one or two individuals who find the time to optimise. What
24See also the work on limited attention spans by Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008), which advocates the view that the poor
may miss or delay investment opportunities because of time and attention they spend on domestic problems.
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would this explanation imply for our results on the treatment effect? If random factors determine
who chooses first, then early adopter areas need not be different at all from late adopter areas in
their savings behaviour, and what we are observing is an actual treatment effect. This explanation
is supported empirically by the fact that early adopters did not choose higher monthly contributions
than late adopters did, as can be seen from the lack of correlation between entry month and monthly
deposit in Table V.
Of course, one may question that the adoption decision is a sequential process in a random order.
Instead, we may believe that the order in which individuals optimise may result from heterogeneous
savings preferences. This leads us to a technology adoption scenario as presented in Besley and Case
(1994): Information (about manageability) is a public good, and those with higher stakes in the public
good have bigger incentives to adopt the product first to learn about it. For example, those who have
a higher income may have higher potential gains from the product, and may thus adopt early. Areas
who have more of such “pioneers” will then adopt the product faster, even if the area is not richer on
average. Note that we do not need to assume different degrees of risk-aversion for this explanation.
What are the implications for savings? The group of pioneers that causes an area to adopt earlier than
another area may be small, so that early adoption areas do not necessarily differ much on average
from late adoption areas, keeping the selection bias small. If, however, the group of pioneers is large,
and pioneers follow different savings trends (for instance, because their income grows faster) than the
average client, then there is a positive selection bias, and we are overestimating the treatment effect.
Furthermore, area does not predict early adoption perfectly. If it is generally the case that richer, or
more educated clients in all areas tend to adopt early, and these groups follow a higher savings trend,
then there will be a positive selection bias. Another classic issue in the technology adoption literature
is risk aversion: With higher risk aversion, the value of learning is higher. Intuitively, people who
are more risk averse will adopt later, waiting deliberately for the information revealed by the actions
and experience of others. Regarding LTS savings, risk averse clients are likely to commit to higher
amounts and longer contracts the later they enter. Hence, if risk aversion is what drives adoption
timing, we may expect monthly contributions and contract length to be negatively correlated with
early adoption (which the data confirms for contract length but not for monthly deposits). However,
we cannot make any statement about the sign of the selection bias: If the most risk averse clients are
in the control group (i.e. they are late adopters), then what matters are their savings contributions
before adopting LTS. Without LTS, we may expect risk averse clients to save more in levels than other
clients, e.g. as an insurance to income uncertainty. But we cannot conclude anything on the change in
their savings during the treatment period.
Finally, what insights can be derived from the model outlined in Section 2? As mentioned in the
technology adoption scenario, agents who adopt early may be those who have the highest potential
gains from LTS, and consequently the largest interest in learning whether or not it is manageable.
The model identifies these agents as those with β ∈ [βˆB, βˆ), respectively p ∈ (pmax, pBmax]. In other
words, theory suggests that early adopters may be those who can reach their desired savings goal p
with LTS but not without it. Late adopters could have reached their p in autarky, but at less smooth
savings contributions – thus their potential return to LTS is positive, but their stake in learning about
its manageability is lower. The main implication of the model are heterogeneous treatment effects: If
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the variation of β in the population is low and that of p is high, then early adopters are the clients
who aim for higher p’s, and who need LTS to achieve them. If p does not vary in the population, but
β varies, then everyone aims for the same savings goal, but those with lower β need LTS to achieve
it. In both cases, the treatment effect is higher for early adopters than it would be for late adopters.
Finally, β and p could be constant across the population, with variation consisting only in the degree
of relatives’ claims, µ. Since pmax increases in µ (for given β), clients with demanding relatives (low
µ) may need LTS to achieve a p that clients with higher µ can achieve without LTS. So clients with
low µ adopt early, and again the treatment effect is bigger for early adopters.
What about the selection bias, E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | T]− E[SNTit − SNTi, t−1 | NT]? Absent treatment, early
adopters would have saved zero as they could not achieve their desirable p, hence the change in their
savings is zero. Late adopters may have been saving for p at home during the treatment period.
Whether or not this contribution increased or decreased from t to t + 1 depends on their allocation
of the savings burden p− 1 across periods. In the language of the model, if LTS was introduced in
a period 1, and β, p, u(ct) were such that s1 > s¯ in autarky, then their savings would decrease from
period 1 to 2, causing a positive selection bias. If s1 < s¯, the selection bias would be negative. Finally,
one may argue that late adopters anticipated saving with LTS in the following period, and thus did
not save at home, resulting in a selection bias of zero.
This subsection has discussed a small number of factors that may have determined adoption tim-
ing – many others remain in the dark. The herding model is consistent with adoption in some areas
but not in others, and is further supported by the lack of correlation between monthly contribution
and entry timing as well as the non-existence of pre-existing time trends. Classical technology adop-
tion mechanisms are supported by the fact that late adopters choose longer contracts. Finally, timing
may be explained by different degrees of hyperbolic discounting or stronger claims from relatives.
While this preliminary analysis does not have survey data on client’s time preferences, studies like
Ashraf et al. (2006b) show that individuals with a lower β and a higher degree of sophistication will
be most interested in a commitment savings product.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proposition 1: u(1 + s1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1 + s1 − s2∗) + βu(1 + s2∗) holds if s1 is bigger than
some threshold value, s1 ≥ smin .
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that once s1 is high enough to satisfy the equation above (i.e. buying
the good is optimal), the equation will also be satisfied for all higher values of s1. Consider a value s′1
such that buying the good is optimal, i.e. we know
u(1+ s′1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s′1 − s2) + βu(1+ s2) for ∀s2 < p− 1.
Since the equation holds for all s2 < p − 1 , it will also hold for s2 ∗ (s′′1 ) - the s2 that is optimal at
a higher level s′′1 > s
′
1, conditional on the nondivisible not being bought. Due to strict concavity of
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u(ct), we further know that
u(1+ s′1 − s2 ∗ (s′′1 ))− u(1+ s′1 − (p− 1)) ≥ u(1+ s′′1 − s2 ∗ (s′′1 ))− u(1+ s′′1 − (p− 1)),
i.e. the consumption gain (p − 1) − s2∗ from deciding not to save for the good in period 2 gives a
higher utility gain when starting from consumption level 1+ s′1 than when starting from consumption
level 1+ s′1’ . Since
βu(b)− βu(1+ s2 ∗ (s′′1 )) ≥ u(1+ s′1 − s2 ∗ (s′′1 ))− u(1+ s′1 − (p− 1))
is true by the optimality of buying the good at s′1, substitution yields
u(1+ s′′1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s′′1 − s2 ∗ (s′′1 )) + βu(1+ s2 ∗ (s′′1 )) for all s′′1 > s′1.
Hence, once s1 crosses some threshold smin, saving for the good will be optimal for all s1 ≥ smin.
Proposition 2: smin is weakly decreasing in β.
Proof. Consider a β < 1 and its corresponding smin(β). We know that
u(1+ smin − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ smin − s2) + βu(1+ s2) for ∀s2 < p− 1.
Increasing β to β¯ > β at unchanged s1 will always preserve the inequality, since u(b) > u(1+ s2) for
∀s2 < p− 1, and generally allow for a lower smin. Thus, smin is weakly decreasing in β.
Proposition 3: smax is weakly increasing in β.
Proof. For a given β,
u(1− s1) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ (1+ 2β)u(1)
will hold for s1 = smax(β). Given that u(1− s1) < u(1), it must be true that u(2 + s1 − p) + u(b) ≥
2u(1). This statement does not depend on β, so it will also hold for a higher β¯ > β, at unchanged
s1. Can the same argument be used to show that the inequality also holds for a lower β˜ < β? No:
As β decreases, the weight of the inequality u(1− s1) < u(1) will rise, which will eventually flip the
inequality in lifetime utility into the opposite direction. Hence, smax(β) is weakly increasing in β.
Proposition 4: smin is weakly increasing in p.
Proof. Recall that for ∀s1 ≥ smin,
u(1+ s1 − (p− 1)) + βu(b) ≥ u(1+ s1 − s2 ∗ (s1)) + βu(1+ s2 ∗ (s1)).
Consider a lower p′ < p. At unchanged s1, the left-hand side of the equation unambiguously in-
creases. The optimal s2∗ conditional on not buying the good only depends on s1 and not on p, thus
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the right-hand side is unchanged.25 Hence, the inequality will always hold. So smin never increases
for lower p, hence smin(p, β) must be weakly increasing in p.
Proposition 5: smax is weakly decreasing in p.
Proof. Recall that for ∀s1 ≤ smax,
u(1− s1) + βu(2+ s1 − p) + βu(b) ≥ (1+ 2β)u(1).
Consider a lower p′ < p. At unchanged s1, the left-hand side of the equation unambiguously in-
creases, while the right-hand side is unchanged. Therefore, the inequality always holds, so smax never
decreases for lower p, thus smax(p, β) must be weakly decreasing in p.
Proposition 6: When βˆB < βˆ, introduction of the commitment product weakly decreases |s¯− s1| for all
β ∈ [βˆB, 1].
Proof. For β < βˆB ≤ βˆ, savings are zero both in autarky and the banking case. For β ≥ βˆB, if
equilibrium savings in autarky are within [sˆ, s¯], introduction of the penalty leaves smin unchanged
and increases smax. Period 1 will never save s1 ∈ (sˆ, s¯), but instead jump to s1 = s¯, leading to an even
distribution of savings. If the equilibrium savings in autarky are above s¯ (such as for βˆ in Figure 2), the
commitment product decreases smin and increases smax. Conditional on s¯ ≤ smin ≤ smax, equilibrium
savings are s1 = max{smin, sopt}, where sopt ≤ p−12 = s¯ (sopt = p−12 for β = 1 and then decreases in
β).26 Thus, if s1 > s¯ in autarky, then it must be that smin > sopt, so a regular saver product will reduce
equilibrium s1 towards s¯, improving consumption smoothing from a welfare perspective.
25An exception arises if p′ − 1 < s2 ∗ (s1) < p− 1, i.e. the optimal way to split period 1’s savings is already sufficient to buy
the good at the new lower price. In this case the agent will definitely buy the good, so the statement that smin is sufficient at
the lower p′ still holds.
26Basu (2012).
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